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"Since the primary object of these statutes was
to free the wife from the husband's control of her
property, the courts have generally agreed that they
enable her to maintain an action against him for any
tort against her property interests. Thus she may re-
cover from him for conversion or detention ....
Likewise, since the statutes destroy the unity of the
persons and place them upon an equality, it is held
that the husband may recover from the wife for simi-
lar torts as to his property."26
In nearly every case allowing one spouse to sue the other for
a tort to property interests, marital discord has been
present, and in many of the cases it has been stated as a
prerequisite to bringing the action. In the principal case it
was present and it seems very doubtful that the case would
have ever come to trial had it not been present.
In conclusion, the Maryland position seems unneces-
sarily restrictive. It is based primarily on cases involving
personal injury torts and upon an interpretation of the
Married Women's Property Act which is very limited and
narrow. The principal case was an ideal case for reaching
an opposite result. The Court itself considered it appeal-
ing from the appellant's viewpoint, which was supported
by the dictum in the Cochrane case, as well as the weight of
authority in other jurisdictions. However, the Court saw fit
to saddle itself with this narrow interpretation of the
statutes and is now truly bound by stare decisis. The
remedy lies with the Legislature.
J. PAUL ROGERS
Implied Warranties In The Sale Of Realty
Gilbert Construction Co. v. Gross'
Defendant, a developer, entered into a contract of sale
with Plaintiffs providing for the sale of unimproved lease-
hold property, and for the construction of houses on the
properties by defendant in accord with plans and specifi-
cations attached to the contract prior to conveyance of
title. The specifications called for the construction and
installation of the exact make of pipeless furnaces actually
installed. Plaintiffs sued for an alleged breach of warranty,
showing that the furnaces were unsuitable for the houses,
Op. cit. ibid., 672.
1212 Md. 402, 129 A. 2d 518 (1957).
GILBERT CONST. CO. v. GROSS
and recovered, but the Court of Appeals reversed, reaffirm-
ing the long standing rule that there are no implied warran-
ties in the sale of real estate. The court found that there
was no express warranty of the sufficiency of the furnaces
to heat the houses and continued, "[niot only is there no
express warranty, but in sales of real estate the rule is
that there is no implied warranty."2
On the basis of the decided cases, the statement of the
court is not one with which argument may be made. How-
ever the operation of the rule may be harsh. This may be
seen more clearly in a New Jersey case, Levy v. C. Young
Construction Co., Inc. There, L purchased a newly con-
structed home from Y Co., the developer. Subsequently
serious defects in the construction of the foundation, re-
quiring extensive repairs to sewer pipes, were discovered.
L brought an action against the developer claiming that
he was under a duty to construct the house in a good and
workmanlike manner. The appellate court reversed a judg-
ment for L holding that, in the absence of fraud, conceal-
ment, or express warranty in the deed, he had no remedy
against the developer. The majority of the divided court
said that policy reasons underlie the rule that acceptance
of a deed without covenants is the cut-off point so far as
the vendor's liability is concerned, and continued:
"Were plaintiffs successful under the facts presented
to us, an element of uncertainty would pervade the
entire real estate field. Real estate transactions would
become chaotic if vendors were subjected to liability
after they had parted with ownership and control of
the premises. They could never be certain as to the
limits or termination of their liability.
4
What are these policy considerations? The dissenting
judge in the New Jersey case pointed out that Y was in
the business of building houses and represented that it had
a reasonable amount of skill necessary for the erection of
a house. This representation is impliedly made to whom-
ever purchased a house from him. "A person in the business
of building houses to sell is fully aware that a purchaser
relies upon such an implied representation."' It is sub-
2 Ibid., 408.
846 N. J. Super. 293, 134 A. 2d 717 (1957).
'Ibid., 719. The court cited 'Berger v. Burkhoff, 200 Md. 561, 92 A. 2d 376
(1952).
, Supra, n. 3, dis. op. 720.
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mitted that this judge properly stated what the law should
be.
In support of the conclusion reached, that there are no
implied warranties in the sale of realty, both courts relied
on a section of Williston's treatise on contracts which
states:
"The doctrine of caveat emptor, so far as the title
of personal property is concerned is very nearly abol-
ished, but in the law of real estate it is still in full force.
One who contracts to buy real estate may, indeed, re-
fuse to complete the transaction if the vendor's title is
bad, but one who accepts a deed generally has no
remedy for defect of title, except such as the covenants
in his deed may give him. * * * Still more clearly there
can be no warranty of quality or condition implied in
the sale of real estate. ... "
This appears to be the orthodox property view.'
However a distinction has been made in the situation
where the home purchaser acquires the land prior to com-
mencement or completion of the house. Under such cir-
cumstances the tender and acceptance of the conveyance
cannot be considered the full performance of the contract
by the vendor and any warranties that can be implied from
the contract are still in effect:
"'When the principal object of a contract is to ob-
tain a result, there has been no compliance with the
contract until the result has been obtained.'
"'Where the contract contains a . . . warranty,
express or implied, that the builder's work will be suf-
ficient for the particular purpose, or to accomplish a
certain result, . . . there is no substantial perform-
ance until the work is sufficient for such purpose or
accomplishes such result.' "8
e4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) 2602, 2603, §926.
Most of the cases involve implied warranties in leases: Carusi v. Schul-
merick, 98 F. 2d 605 (D. C. App. 1938) ; Clyne v. Holmes, 61 N. J. L. 358,
39 A. 767 (1898) ; Wood v. Carson, 257 Pa. 522, 101 A. 811 (1917); Federal
Metal Bed Co. v. Alpha Sign Co., 289 Pa. 175, 137 A. 189 (1927) ; Powell
v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S. E. 637 (1927); Clifton
v. Montague, 40 W. Va. 207, 21 S. E. 858 (1895) ; Hart v. Windsor, 12 M.
& W. 67, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (1843). Involving implied warranties in sales
of land; Levy v. Young Con~t. Co., Inc., 46 N. J. Super. 293, 134 A. 2d 717
(1957) ; Otto v. Bolton & Norris, [1936] 2 K. B. 46, 1 All Eng. 960 (1936)
Allen v. Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 237 P. 2d 818 (1951).
8 Glass v. Wiesner, 172 Kan. 133, 238 P. 2d 712, 716 (1951).
Where a person holds himself out to be specially qualified to perform
work of a particular character, there is an implied warranty that the work
GILBERT CONST. CO. v. GROSS
It has only been in recent years that the mass production
of homes has become widespread. In earlier times land
transactions generally involved the sale of homes that had
been constructed for some time, or unimproved land which
the purchaser intended subsequently to improve. In the
latter case no warranties, other than of title, could be
expected.9 The land is something readily observable and
about which both parties have equal ability to inquire.
In the case of old homes warranties should not be implied,
for it is more logical to charge the buyer with knowledge
that, since the house is old, some defects undoubtedly ex-
ist.10 In the absence of fraud or concealment, for which
relief is already available, warranties, if implied, would
impose undeserved liability.
Now where the owner builds his home on his own land,
the implied warranties of suitability for intended purpose,
and of workmanship, by the contractor will protect him.
But if the home-buyer, as is the usual case today, goes to a
developer and enters into a contract to purchase a selected
lot with a "model home" upon it, taking title after com-
pletion of the construction, he has no protection if he
accepts delivery of the deed before discovery of the defect."
It would appear that he relies on the developer to construct
a home in a good and workmanlike manner suitable for
comfortable living no less heavily than in the first situa-
tion, yet the same protection is not afforded him. Full pro-
tection under the rule now followed would require that
the home-buyer hire his own architect, engineers, and spe-
cialists to examine the plans and specifications to see if
the house is well planned, and a supervisor or inspector
during construction to insure proper workmanship. This
would defeat the purpose of mass developments: the pro-
duction of homes at low cost. The problem of the develop-
which he does shall be of proper workmanship and reasonably fit for the
intended purpose. Glass v. Wiesner, ibid; Gaybis v. Palm, 201 Md. 78, 93
A. 2d 269 (1952); 17 C. J. S. 781, Contracts, §329; Swersky v. Higgins,
194 Va. 983, 76 S. E. 2d 200 (1953) ; Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S. C. 263,
64 S. E. 2d 8&5 (1951) ; Whaley v. Milton Const. & Supply Co., 241 S. W.
2d 23 (Mo. 1951) ; Kuitems v. Covell, 104 Cal. App. 2d 482, 231 P. 2d 552
(1951).
1 Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 52, 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (1843).
10Combow v. Kansas City Ground Inv. Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S. W. 2d
539, 8 A. L. R. 2d 213 (1949), in which the court specifically pointed out
the house was old.
"Otto v. Bolton & Norris, [1936) 2 K. B. 46, 1 All Eng. 960 (1936) ; Levy
v. C. Young Construction Co., Inc., 46 N. J. Super. 293, 134 A. 2d 717 (1957) ;
Allen v. Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 237 P. 2d 818 (1951) ; 8 A L. R. 2d 218;
Selker, Rights of Purchaser in Sale of Defective House, 4 Western Res.
L. Rev. 357 (1953) ; Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land
for a Particular Purpose, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 108 (1953).
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ment home, in short, seems distinguishable from the sale
of old homes and of unimproved land to which the property
rule is properly applied and more nearly fits the situation
of the construction after land purchase cases where only
contract principles are applied.
It would appear that the possibility for a change in the
present rule would be more likely if the courts analyzed
the problem presented in the development home cases be-
fore following a rule no longer suited to the times. Of all
the reported cases, only in the New Jersey case12 has any
real thought been devoted to the problem. Other courts
have rather mechanically framed the question and sum-
marily dismissed it as without merit. So little attention has
been paid to the unique position of the development home
that it is often difficult or impossible to determine from
the opinion whether a development house was involved.
A parallel to the suggested change in this field may be seen
in the evolution of the law of sales of chattels. There, as
the mass manufacture of goods increased, and the relation
between the manufacturer and the consumer became less
personal, warranties were implied.3 Ultimately these war-
ranties were embodied in Section fifteen of the Uniform
Sales Act. 4
Three approaches to the solution of the problem have
been suggested. The voluntary action of the builders them-
selves providing express warranties is of course the best
solution. The National Association of Home Builders has
suggested to its members that a written warranty be given
new home purchasers stating that the building, upon de-
livery, was structurally sound and free from defects in
material and workmanship and promising to repair any
defect within a stated period of time or before resale.
Ultimately a much less beneficial "Service Policy" was de-
cided upon. 5 The second would be a statute implying cer-
tain warranties as to workmanship and fitness. The only
statute relating to the 'subject in any way is an English one
imposing warranties of habitability on lessors of low cost
46 N. J. Super. 293, 134'A. 2d 717 (1957), dis. op. 720.
3 1 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed., 1948) 501 et seq., §§195, 196; LLEWELLYN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES, (1930) 204.
11 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. $3, §33, and see Luria Bros. & Co. v. Klaff, 139
Md. 586, 115 A. 849 (1921), discussing §15 of the Uniform Act (then Art.
83, §36.)
"Dunham, supra, n. 11, 108-110; Brockland, Why a Service Policy? 6
N. A. H. B. (1952) Correlator 2. This warranty would not cover situations
such as that presented in the instant ease however.
GILBERT CONST. CO. v. GROSS
housing.'6 A New York attempt to pass a more general
statute was unsuccessful.
The following suggested model could be used as a guide
in the drafting of such a statute for Maryland:
§1. Subject to the provisions of this act, there is no
warranty or condition implied by law as to quality
or fitness for any particular purpose of any im-
provement upon realty continuing after acceptance
of the deed to the realty, except as follows:
(a) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication
makes known to the seller the particular pur-
pose for which the improvements are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the
seller's skill and judgment, there is an implied
warranty that the improvement shall be rea-
sonably fit for such purpose.
(b) Where the improvement is bought by descrip-
tion or sample, there is an implied warranty
that the improvement shall be of workmanlike
quality and shall correspond to the description
or sample.
(c) The warranties in (a) and (b) shall continue
for one year from the date of delivery of the
conveyance to the buyer and shall inure to the
original purchaser, his heirs, personal represen-
tatives and assigns during such one year period.
§2. As used in this act:
(a) "Buyer" means the original purchaser of im-
proved realty, and the heirs, personal repre-
sentatives, and assigns of such original pur-
chaser.
(b) "Seller" means any person or corporation
whose business it is to erect or otherwise create
an improvement upon realty, or to whom a
completed improvement has been conveyed for
resale in the course of his (its) business.
(c) "Improvement" includes all fixtures, and struc-
tures attached to realty.
(d) "Realty" includes both freehold and redeemable
leasehold estates.
Housing Act of 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Ed. 8, Vol. 2, c. 51.
17 Dunham, supra, n. 11, 108-9.
19581
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§3. No act or agreement of the buyer before, at the
time of, or after, the making of a contract for the
purchases of newly constructed improvements on
realty, nor any agreement or statement by the
buyer in such contract shall constitute a valid wai-
ver of the provisions of §1.
Perhaps the most immediate remedial effort would lie
in a third direction. In the instant case, as in perhaps a
majority of development home cases, the purchaser had
an F.H.A. mortgage loan.' s Modifications of existing F.H.A.
regulations requiring higher standards of workmanship and
materials, and their enforcement by that agency might
effectively encourage irresponsible builders more ade-
quately to prepare plans and perform construction con-
tracts. For the practicing attorney at the present time, the
only method of protecting his client would seem to be to
compel the builder, at the time of the conveyance, to sign
a warranty agreement. Under the decided cases it would
appear that such an agreement, being collateral in nature,
would not be merged in the subsequent conveyance.19
NELSON R. KEI, JR.
Implied Invitation
Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Kane'
Appellee Kane, in the course of his employment as a
truck driver, was sent to pick up freight at appellant's
warehouse. He had to drive up to a loading platform adja-
cent to appellant's parking lot. Smoking was prohibited in
the yard, on the loading platform, and in the warehouse.
iS212 Md. 402, 407, 129 A. 2d 518 (1957). The F. H. A. form provided:
"'The construction shall equal or exceed the applicable FHA Mini-
mum Construction Requirements and shall comply with applicable codes
and regulations, zoning ordinances, restrictive covenants, and the ex-
hibits submitted with the related application, as corrected by FHA.
The highest of all the aforegoing shall govern. Each item of material
or equipment shall equal or exceed that described or indicated. All
parts shall be sound and all construction free of faults. All work shall
be performed in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with the
best practice. * * *' "
Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 142 A. 598 (1928) ; Edison Realty Co.
v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 62 A. 2d 354 (1948) ; Laurel Realty Co. v.
Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 72 A. 2d 23 (1950).
1213 Md. 152, 131 A. 2d 470 (1957).
